Coping with the Fallout for Preference-receiving Countries from EU Sugar Reform by Chaplin, Hannah & Matthews, Alan
Volume 7 Number 1 2006/p.15-31  esteyjournal.com 
Editorial Office: 410 22
nd St. E., Suite 820, Saskatoon, SK, Canada, S7K 5T6. 




Coping with the Fallout for  
Preference-receiving Countries  
from EU Sugar Reform  
Hannah Chaplin  
Institute of International Studies, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland 
Alan Matthews 
Department of Economics, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland 
Developing countries can produce sugar at much lower cost than it can be produced in 
the EU, yet reform of the EU sugar policy will result in both winners and losers among 
them. Reform will benefit competitive sugar exporters currently excluded from the EU 
market. It will adversely affect those developing countries that currently benefit from 
preferential import access to the EU’s high-priced sugar market, while diminishing the 
benefits received by those least-developed countries to which duty-free and quota-free 
access has been promised after July 2009. This article identifies the countries likely to 
lose and the extent of their potential losses. It examines alternative proposals that have 
been put forward to assist these countries to adjust to the adverse effects of EU sugar 
policy reform and contributes to the debate by putting forward a further proposal. 
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Introduction 
he EU Commission’s initial proposal to reform the sugar Common Market 
Organisation (CMO) in July 2004 (EC, 2004a) and that of June 2005 (EC, 
2005b) have stirred strong debate within the development community due to their 
likely implications for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and least-developed 
countries (LDCs) with privileged access to the EU market. The EU is a high-cost 
sugar producer and its highly supported production contributes to oversupply and 
lower prices on world markets, to the detriment of efficient, low-cost developing-
country sugar exporters such as Brazil and Thailand. The need for reform of the EU 
sugar policy from a development perspective is accepted. However, development 
opinion is divided between those who argue in favour of maintaining the value of 
preferences by keeping a high EU support price and managing the market by severe 
quota cuts on the EU’s own production, and those who call for the liberalisation of the 
EU sugar market (perhaps maintaining relatively low tariffs) with compensation for 
the preference-receiving countries that would be adversely affected by this reform. 
This article evaluates this debate in the light of the Commission’s own proposal 
for assistance to ACP countries and the arguments put forward by preference-
receiving countries. The first section of the article provides the background to the 
debate through a brief overview of the current CMO of the sugar sector and the array 
of preference agreements contained within it. The main elements of the reform 
proposals are described in section 2. Section 3 looks at the likely negative impacts for 
the ACP countries and the LDCs respectively. Section 4 examines the proposals that 
have been put forward to mitigate these adverse effects, and in it we make our own 
proposals for the way forward. Section 5 summarises the arguments made. 
1. The EU Sugar Regime and the Role of Preferences 
he EU sugar market is heavily supported: the domestic price is about three times 
the world price. The EU sugar CMO is based on the use of import tariffs, the 
special safeguard permitted under the World Trade Organisation Agreement on 
Agriculture, export subsidies, production quotas and a guaranteed minimum price. 
There are two types of quota, A and B, both of which are set at the member-state level. 
The former approximates to national consumption, while the latter is exported with 
subsidies. A levy on the production of both A-quota and B-quota sugar finances the 
cost of export subsidies, so the internal support measures are largely budget-neutral. 
Production that exceeds quota (referred to as C sugar) is sold on the world market 
T 
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without export subsidies. The high level of support is an important factor in the EU 
being the second largest sugar exporter in the world.  
The EU sugar CMO includes several preferential trade agreements, which have 
created direct links between the price paid under the EU CMO and the price received 
by some developing countries. The most significant by volume is that with the ACP 
countries and India while that with the LDCs, the Everything but Arms (EBA) 
initiative, is of increasing importance. Other agreements cover imports from Brazil 
and Cuba (85,473 tonnes); overseas countries and territories (OCT) of the EU such as 
the Dutch Antilles (approximately 20,000 tonnes); and the Balkans (300,000 tonnes). 
The focus here is on the ACP and EBA agreements, since the other agreements are for 
relatively small quantities. 
Under the agreement with the ACP countries and India, a total of 1,304,700 
tonnes of white sugar–equivalent obtains the EU reference price duty-free. Each 
participating country is assigned a quota, which determines the quantities it is allowed 
(and required) to export to the EU under the agreement (table 1). Quotas were 
determined according to the historical importance of a given country as a sugar 
supplier to the UK. Thus, the main sugar traders with the UK during the colonial 
period have the biggest quotas: Mauritius has the largest, while Fiji and Guyana also 
have important shares. 
 
Table 1  Distribution of Import Quotas by ACP Countries and India 
(tonnes of white sugar–equivalent) 
 
  Tonnes (white 
sugar–equivalent) 
Percentage of ACP 
quota allocated 
Barbados 50,312  3.9 
Belize 40,349  3.1 
DR Congo  10,186  0.8 
Fiji 165,348  12.7 
Guyana 159,410  12.2 
Ivory Coast  10,186  0.8 
Jamaica 118,696  9.1 
Madagascar 10,760  0.8 
Malawi 20,824  1.6 
Mauritius 491,031  37.6 
St Kitts and Nevis  15,591  1.2 
Swaziland 117,845  9.0 
Tanzania 10,186  0.8 
Trinidad/Tobago 43,751  3.4 
Zimbabwe 30,225  2.3 
India 10,000  0.8 
Total  1,304,700     H. Chaplin and A. Matthews 
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The EBA scheme allows duty free access to the EU market for the 50 least-
developed countries, including 6 ACP Sugar Protocol signatories. Under the 
agreement, special provisions have been adopted for sugar to allow a gradual 
approach to full market access, which will be achieved from 1 July 2009. Until 
2005/6, exports are limited by quota, which increases gradually to 129,751 tonnes. 
Between 2006 and 2008, quantity restrictions will no longer apply and customs duties 
will be gradually reduced by 20 percent, 50 percent and 80 percent. Only those 
countries that have signed the Framework Agreement with the EU are eligible to 
benefit from this quota access. Twenty-six countries have signed this agreement but, 
in practice, very few are net exporters and only a handful export to the EU (table 2). 
 
Table 2  EBA Countries with Sugar Export Capacity (tonnes of white sugar– 
  equivalent) 
 
  2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
(expected) 
Burkina  Faso  7,073 7,237 7,672 
Sudan  16,257 17,037 16,979 
Ethiopia  14,298 14,689 15,249 
Malawi  10,402 10,661 10,959 
Tanzania    9,065 9,317 9,940 
Zambia    8,758 9,017 9,538 
Mozambique 8,331  8,384  10,116 
Source: LMC, 2004 
 
In addition to these imports, further quantities are imported from these countries 
as well as Zambia and Kenya as special preferential sugar (SPS) to cater to the needs 
of EU sugar refineries. The Commission established a ceiling, known as maximum 
supply needs (MSN), on total imports to the EU’s seven sugar refineries. SPS imports 
make up the difference between the MSN quantity and the total arising from other 
preferential sources. Since OCT quantities vary according to their production levels, 
and EBA volumes are increasing annually, the shortfall that is imported as SPS also 
varies. SPS sugar receives a minimum price that is slightly below that of ACP/India 
sugar. 
The value of preferences for a given country in a specific year depends on the 
volume of sugar the country exports to the EU under the Sugar Protocol or the EBA 
Framework Agreement and on the world price: the lower the world price, the greater 
the value of preferences. For the year 2003, we estimate the premium obtained by 
ACP beneficiaries to be about €476 million using actual volumes traded rather than 
quotas. This is close to the figure of $470 million in 2001 estimated by Milner,   H. Chaplin and A. Matthews 
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Morgan and Zgovu (2004). The distribution of the premium obtained from preferences 
is correlated to the allocation of quota amongst preference-receiving countries.     
2. EU Sugar Policy Reform 
everal factors have contributed to the need for the EU to reform its sugar CMO. 
CAP reform has focused on shifting production-linked support to decoupled 
payments, so there is a desire to shift the sugar CMO towards this model. The EBA 
Agreement opens the EU to increases in sugar imports, with estimates of volumes 
varying from 900,000 tonnes (EC, 2001) to 3.9 million tonnes per year (LMC, 2004).
1 
Due to the EU’s self-sufficiency in sugar, any increase in imports will translate into an 
increase in exports, which is only possible with the use of export subsidies. The latter 
are constrained by quantities agreed under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, so 
that an increase in LDC imports after July 2009 will require a one-for-one reduction in 
domestic EU production.  
This pressure will be exacerbated by a successful outcome of the Doha Round if it 
results in the eventual elimination of export subsidies. This would require the 
elimination of B-quota production, which can only be exported with their aid. In 
addition, the panel in the WTO dispute brought by Australia, Thailand and Brazil 
concluded in 2005 that C-sugar exports should be included under export subsidy 
limits as should the 1.6 million tonnes exported annually with export subsidies, which 
represents an equivalent volume to that imported under the ACP protocol and SPS. 
Finally, the Doha Round negotiations are addressing the issue of high tariffs, which 
reduce market access. Any agreement to reduce tariffs and/or to restrict the use of the 
special safeguard measure would compromise the ability of the EU to retain the high 
internal sugar price. 
In response to these pressures, the EU Commission put forward a reform proposal 
in July 2004, which was revised in the light of member-state reactions and the 
outcome of the WTO dispute in June 2005. The main elements are summarised and 
compared in table 3. 
S   H. Chaplin and A. Matthews 
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Table 3   Main Elements of the Commission Reform Proposals of 14 July  
2004 and 22 June 2005 
 
July 2004  June 2005 
A and B quotas combined. 16% 
reduction in EU sugar quotas. 
A and B quotas combined. No 
compulsory quota cuts until at least 
2010. Additional 1 million tonnes of 
quota to be made available to C 
sugar–producing member states. 
33% reduction in the white sugar 
guide price by 2007/8.  
39% reduction in the white sugar 
guide price over 2 years (by 2007/8).  
Cut in the raw sugar price from 
€523.7/tonne to €329. Raw sugar 
price to be cut over 3 years by 
2008/09. 
Cut in the raw sugar price from 
€523.7/tonne to €319.5. Raw sugar 
price to be cut over 4 years to 
2009/10. 
37% reduction in the sugar beet 
price, 60% will be offset by direct 
payments to farmers. 
42.6% reduction in the sugar beet 
price. 60% compensation to EU 
producers. 
EU sugar quotas previously allocated 
by country to be freely tradable 
Europe-wide. 
Quota restructuring scheme in which 
closing sugar factories will renounce 
their quota. 
Maximum supply needs ceiling 
abolished from 2009/10. 
 
Maximum supply needs ceiling to 
remain in place. Between 2006–
2009, 75% to be derived from ACP 
countries/India. Beyond 2008/9 this 
will hold for only the first 3 months of 
the marketing year. Other sugar 
processors to be allowed to import 
and refine raw sugar. 
 
3. Impact of EU Sugar Reform on Preference Recipients 
or ACP countries, the revenue loss on exports to the EU for sugar exported under 
the Sugar Protocol and the EBA Framework Agreement is estimated at around 
€250 million (table 4). These figures are likely to be an underestimate of the full 
impact on supplier countries. They do not allow for the fact that some countries may 
no longer find it profitable to export sugar at the lower EU reference price, even 
though it remains significantly above the world price level. Second, the loss to those 
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ACP states that are also EBA countries would be expected to grow over time as their 
access quota increases up to 2009/10 and they have full access after that date. Third, 
the setting of a minimum level of 75 percent of maximum-supply-needs sugar to be 
sourced from ACP countries/India does not include SPS quantities. This will open the 
way for refiners to substitute EBA sugar for SPS, which will adversely affect those 
non-LDC ACP countries that currently supply SPS. For LDCs, SPS can simply be 
exported as EBA sugar, under which terms they will not be subject to varying quotas. 
However, for non-LDC countries, this will represent reduced access to the EU market, 
and effectively a loss of preferences. The major SPS supplier in this category is 
Swaziland (table 4).  
For the purposes of discussing the impacts of reform, ACP countries can be 
broadly classified into three groups: ACP LDCs, ACP non-LDCs with available 
alternatives and ACP non-LDCs in cyclonic regions.  
ACP LDCs have the potential to offset losses on their current quota exports to the 
EU by increasing their export volumes under EBA. Some of these countries are 
competitive, low-cost producers such as Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Also, for 
these countries as well as Kenya, the EU currently represents only a small proportion 
of their sugar exports. Benefits from the reform may be obtained in third-country 
markets where competition from the EU will be reduced as a result of the reform 
lowering production and, therefore, export volumes. However, the magnitude of this 
effect may not be that significant. The reform will lower EU sugar exports to the 
world market, which would in turn be expected to result in an increase in the world 
price. The impact of this will largely depend on whether Brazil will replace these 
volumes on the world market. Brazil is the world’s most competitive large-scale sugar 
supplier, with a very elastic export supply capacity at the current world price 
(Koizumi, 2003).
2 Any upward movement in the world price as a result of EU sugar 
reform will be very limited because of Brazil’s elastic export supply.   
Apart from uncertainty about the size of any world price increase following EU 
reform, the extent to which individual preference-receiving countries will gain will 
also depend on the proportion of their exports to non-EU markets and the extent to 
which their exports benefit from preference agreements with other countries. 
Countries that export to the United States under preferential agreements, for example, 
will not benefit from any increase in the world market price for those exports. Zambia, 
whose main export market is DR Congo, is the only ACP or EBA country likely to 
benefit from any world market price increase. 
For non-LDC ACP countries with a high dependence on the EU market, the 
adjustment problems will be greater. In all cases, sugar is an important agricultural   H. Chaplin and A. Matthews 
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crop, and as such, plays an important role in their rural economies. Countries that will 
suffer the highest absolute losses are those with the largest quotas, namely Mauritius, 
Fiji and Guyana. These three countries are all high-cost producers, with costs that are 
more than twice those of low-cost ACP producers such as Swaziland, Zambia and 
Malawi. Their high-cost structure has arisen largely as a result of having had a secure 
export market for a long period under the ACP protocol. The high price has become 
institutionalised, leading to a lack of competitiveness on the world market (Larson & 
Borrell, 2001).   
The impact assessment of sugar reform carried out for the European Commission 
suggests that, at the proposed lower price, sugar production will no longer be 
financially viable and will cease in Mauritius and Guyana (EC, 2003). Mauritius is 
attempting to restructure its sugar sector and to reduce its reliance on sugar through 
the development of tourism and financial services. It is the sheer size of the sugar 
transfer that makes adjustment difficult for Mauritius. For Fiji, sugar has been 
replaced by tourism as the main source of foreign exchange revenue, thereby reducing 
reliance on sugar in the economy as a whole. However, the reform will still affect 
rural areas where sugar is grown by small-scale farmers. Inefficiencies remain within 
the sugar sector that could potentially be reduced, thereby maintaining the profitability 
of the sector despite the reduced price. Guyana has recently invested in a new sugar 
mill that will increase output. Through this it expects to reap some benefits from the 
predicted exit of some other ACP countries from sugar production. The precise 
position of Guyana appears ambiguous, with some studies suggesting its production 
may be in danger (EC, 2003; Gillson, Hewitt and Page, 2005) and others that it should 
survive (Gillson, Hewitt and Page, 2005). Swaziland is a lower-cost producer than the 
others in this group, which could provide it with scope to benefit from the exit of other 
ACP countries. Overall, for this group, the reform will seriously affect sugar revenues, 
but adjustments are underway to counteract the effects. 
The group of countries that gives rise to the most concern in relation to the reform 
are those in cyclonic regions in which sugar cane is virtually the only crop that can be 
grown. This results in highly specialised agricultural sectors with little potential to 
diversify. Not only are their agricultural incomes and exports heavily reliant on the 
sugar CMO, but they are also high-cost producers. Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and 
Tobago and St.Kitts and Nevis even have production costs above the EU average 
(Kerkela & Huan-Niemi, 2005). Even if land prices adjusted to the lower sugar price 
in the long run, their production costs would still need to fall in order to match those 
of competitive producers. This would require investment, which may not be justified 
given the extent of their uncompetitiveness and thus the low potential returns. Hence,   H. Chaplin and A. Matthews 
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these countries are all likely to exit sugar production under the proposed EU sugar 
reform (Gillson, Hewitt and Page, 2005). For these countries, climatic constraints give 
limited scope to diversify into other export crops in order to offset losses. 
Furthermore, there is little evidence that these countries have engaged in adjustment in 
anticipation of reform of the CMO. Trinidad and Tobago have a lesser problem due to 
their natural resources of oil and gas, which provide foreign exchange revenue. 
Barbados and St.Kitts and Nevis both have tourist industries, which have overtaken 
sugar in importance to their economies, but these have been hit by the downturn in 
tourism since September 11
th. Jamaica poses a greater problem in that, despite having 
a diversified economy, it suffers from high unemployment and debt levels of 150 
percent of GDP. The sugar reform and the likely exit from sugar production are likely 












Figure 1 Total sugar exports by ACP countries and the proportion of their exports 









































Total sugar exports (T)
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Barbados 2003 33,634  50,312  100.0  6,868,062.8  0  6,868,063 
Congo 1995  13,715  10,186  99.9  (under 
ACP 74.2) 
2,079,981.2 0 2,079,981 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
2003 41,709  10,186  89.8  (under 
ACP 24.4) 
2,079,981 8,826,872  10,906,854 
Fiji 2003  270,582  165,348  71.4  33,764,061.6  9,014,251  42,778,313 
Guyana 2003  307,642  159,410  60.1  32,551,522  8,248,796  40,800,318 
Jamaica 2002  112,094  118,696  100.0  22,889,594.8  0  22,889,595 
Kenya 2003  38,197  na  0.2    2,472,874  2,472,874 
Madagascar 2003  3,708  10,760  81.4  757,173.6  0  757,174 
Malawi 2003  268,241 20,824 32.4  (under 
ACP 7.7) 
6,429,237 0  6,429,237 
Mauritius 2003  491,973  491,031  89.9  100,268,530.2    100,268,530 
St Kitts and 
Nevis 
2001 14,052  15,591  99.9  2,869,418  0  2,869,418 
Surinam 2001  2  na  100.0    647  647 
Swaziland   na  117,845  69  24,063,949  9,711,000  33,774,949 
Tanzania 2003 23,178  10,186  98.2  (under 
ACP 43.9) 
3,982,512.6 0 3,982,513 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
2002 37,425  43,751  80.3  7,642,185  0  7,642,185 
Zambia 2002  103,976  na  25.8  5,477,829.994  0  5,477,830 
Zimbabwe 2002  na  30,225  na  6,171,945*    6,171,945 
Total   1,858,986  1,294,700    266,135,250  40,605,630  306,740,881 
 Table 4  Summary of the Importance of Exports to the EU to ACP Countries and the 
Expected Loss in Revenue Resulting from the Proposed Reform of 22 June 
2005 Incorporating a Cut in Institutional Price and Elimination of SPS 
 
 















loss from EU 
exports (€) 
Belize 2002  98,858  40,349  48.1  (under 
ACP 40.8) 
8,239,266 2,331,190  10,570,455   H. Chaplin and A. Matthews 
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The impact of EU sugar reform on EBA countries differs from the impact on ACP 
countries due to the recent and still incomplete introduction of EBA. In the case of 
ACP countries, problems arise because the long-term effects of preferential access 
have become institutionalised in some cases. For EBA countries this has not yet 
occurred; thus, there is not the same degree of dependence on the sugar CMO. As a 
result of reform, EBA countries will generate lower export revenues in the future than 
they would have if the CMO were to remain unreformed. Thus, reform will affect the 
level of investment that can now be expected in their sugar industries. However, the 
sugar price in the EU even after the reform will still be well above the world market 
price due to tariff protection, so preferential duty-free access to this market will still 
be a highly valuable right. At the lower price, of course, fewer EBA countries will find 
it attractive to supply this market. But if the sugar industry in these countries cannot 
become competitive on the basis of the preferential margin of 75 percent or so that 
will continue to exist, it is questionable if such countries should be in sugar production 
in the first place. The price cut resulting from the reform will reduce the potential 
negative effects of becoming dependent on preference agreements in the long term. 
 
4. Proposals for Mitigating the Negative Impacts of 
Reform 
he reform proposals will negatively affect preference-receiving countries through 
lowering their revenue from sugar exports to the EU. In recognition of this, two 
proposals have been put forward to mitigate the impacts, one by the EU, and the other 
by the ACP and LDCs. 
The EU proposal (EC, 2005a) recognises the need to develop sustainable, 
country-specific strategies for adaptation that take into account the constraints and 
opportunities of the sugar sector both at present and in the future as well as national 
development strategies. It also emphasises the need for these strategies to be actively 
pro-poor as opposed to assuming that the poor would benefit through spill-over 
effects. Three main instruments for assistance are proposed: measures to improve 
competitiveness of the sugar industry; the promotion of diversification; and measures 
to address broader adaptation needs. In any country one or all of these approaches 
may be implemented depending on the national situation. 
The Commission has not yet put numbers to the size of the financial package it is 
prepared to make available. The action plan states that “The total envelope for 
assistance will be based amongst others on overall needs of Sugar Protocol countries” 
(EC, 2005a, 13). The total will be divided into national envelopes, with additionally a 
common envelope for projects of general interest, e.g., at the regional level, and a 
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specific provision for administration costs. The Commission proposes to cover the 
cost through the “Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation” instrument 
in the next EU budget financial perspective, to cover the period 2007–2013. Some 
provision for preparatory support for 2006, in the order of €40 million, is envisaged in 
the June 2005 proposals, and the Commission also highlights the availability of the 
FLEX mechanism in the Cotonou Agreement, which can support national budgets in 
case of significant losses of government revenues due to a shortfall in export earnings. 
These proposals are worrying because of their uncertainty. Agreement on the 
budget financial perspective was expected at the June 2005 European Council 
meeting, but deep divisions remain between member states both on the overall size of 
the budget and on its composition. Also, there is no commitment that these funds will 
be additional to what has already been agreed will be available to the ACP countries 
under European Development Fund financing in any event.  
The LDCs, supported by the ACP states, have sought to persuade the EU to follow 
a different reform path for the sugar CMO (LDCs, 2004). In order to avoid a major 
decline in the guaranteed price, the LDCs have offered to postpone the date for full 
liberalisation of their access to the EU market in exchange for a significant increase in 
the sugar preferential quota granted to the LDCs in the intervening period. 
Specifically, the LDCs have indicated that, rather than full access by 2009, they would 
prefer a system of quotas on imports. They have proposed a system to the EU under 
which 
1. Existing import quotas for raw sugar would continue to increase by 15 
percent annually to 2008/9, to reach 197,335 tonnes and thereafter remain 
static until 2015/16. 
2. Between 2015/16 and 2019, tariffs would start to decrease, reaching 
zero by the end of the period. 
3. A second quota would be set up to cover all types of sugar (i.e., refined 
as well as raw) starting in 2004/5 and increasing 15 percent annually to 
2011/12, when it would amount to 1.425 million tonnes, after which it 
would then remain fixed until 2016.  
The rationale behind this proposal is to allow a longer transition period (ten years) 
and to achieve “remunerative prices” (LDCs, 2004). It is believed that this would 
provide a more secure environment for investors, which would aid in attracting further 
investment in and development of the industry in these countries. The commitment of 
LDCs to promoting their proposal was confirmed and supported by the ACP countries 
in the Madrid Declaration of January 2005, through which they reaffirmed their   H. Chaplin and A. Matthews 
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opposition to the CMO reform and agreed on the need for quantitative controls on 
EBA sugar exports to the EU (ACP/LDCs, 2005). 
Neither proposal provides a panacea. The underlying philosophy of the ACP/LDC 
proposal, namely to organise trade volumes at high prices, is diametrically opposed to 
the logic of the sugar policy reform (Mandelson, 2005). It has the disadvantage that it 
could create dependency on a higher sugar price by EBA countries, thereby 
undermining their competitiveness on the world market and promoting investment in 
unsustainable sugar industries. In effect, it would only delay the inevitable bigger 
price cut without providing incentives for adjustment.   
While the EU proposal goes some way in mitigating the impacts of the reform of 
the sugar CMO, it also has limitations. First, the time frame proposed for adjustment 
appears unrealistically short in the context of the barriers to increasing 
competitiveness and diversification in the affected economies. Poor human capital and 
infrastructure in many rural areas in ACP/LDCs limit the capacity to develop 
replacement enterprises and to attract outside investors. Developing diversified 
sources of income sufficient to mitigate the impacts of the reform in four years is a tall 
order. Previous experience with EU assistance to ACP banana producers also 
highlights the potential delays in transferring funds from Brussels given the need to 
make viable project proposals (NERA & Oxford Policy Management, 2004).  
Second, the financing proposed to assist adjustment is nowhere near adequate. 
Internal support measures for sugar are largely budget-neutral, because the main 
burden of support falls on EU consumers. The majority of the sugar CMO budget 
arises as a result of the need to re-export an equivalent amount of sugar to ACP/Indian 
imports (around €800 million of the total CMO cost of €1.72 billion in 2004 (EC, 
2004b)). EU sugar producers will receive a generous 60 percent compensation of their 
revenue loss, which will reach €1.54 billion once the full price cut has been 
implemented. A mere €40 million has been allocated to assist preference-receiving 
countries in 2006; furthermore, this will be financed from existing development fund 
resources and not from the agricultural budget. This is despite the fact that 
expenditure on the re-export of ACP sugar never benefited EU growers and should 
rightly be used as part of the ACP country compensation package.
3 
It is clear that a more innovative proposal which meets the objectives of both 
parties but without the drawbacks of the current proposals is required. We therefore 
propose that, over a ten-year transition period, the EU should continue to provide 
support to the sugar industries of particularly vulnerable ACP economies by means of 
a guaranteed price, which would initially start at the current level but which would 
gradually be reduced over the transition period to the level proposed by the   H. Chaplin and A. Matthews 
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Commission in its reform proposals. Such support would take the form of a deficiency 
payment linked to specific quantities of production. This mechanism should 
complement the proposed structural adjustment assistance and would not be a 
replacement for it. This solution is compatible with the market orientation of the sugar 
reform proposal, it provides the additional breathing space that many of these 
economies require, and yet its self-terminating nature will avoid the problem of 
locking countries into unsustainable lines of production in the longer term. The 
criteria for eligibility for these deficiency payments would have to be worked out, but 
would be based on objective criteria of vulnerability, dependence on EU sugar 
earnings and scope for diversification. Those LDCs that currently benefit from 
preferential exports to the EU under the Framework Agreement should also be eligible 
for these payments. As the amount of the deficiency payment is reduced over time, 
additional resources should be switched to “second window” activities such as 
improving competitiveness and assisting diversification. The financial package for 
these activities should be calculated on the same basis as for EU growers, i.e., 60 
percent compensation for the revenue loss. Given our estimate of the revenue loss of 
€250 million, the compensation package should increase to €150 million per year as 
the reduction in the raw sugar price is phased in. 
Funding for this proposal should be found from the current expenditure on the 
CMO, which, as explained above, largely arises because of ACP exports. However, a 
promise has been made to provide 60 percent compensation to EU growers, so 
additional budget resources will be required. A further source of funding could be 
obtained by placing a consumer levy on sugar (DEFRA, 2005). This could be set at a 
level that would maintain the consumer sugar price at its current level, so that the 
gains from the lower producer price are not transferred to the consumer. This would 
reflect the fact that EU consumers are the main beneficiaries of the sugar reform. A 
further rationale would be to reduce the incentive to increase sugar consumption by 
EU consumers as a result of the lower price, thus avoiding exacerbating the problems 
of obesity and unhealthy eating.  
5. Conclusion 
he EU sugar CMO has an array of preference agreements with developing 
countries. That with the ACP countries is long-standing while that which benefits 
LDCs is of more recent origin and has not yet fully taken effect. Reform of the CMO 
will affect both groups in terms of revenue foregone. The impact will be greater for 
ACP countries due to the degree of dependence on the EU sugar price that has built up 
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over time. In view of this dependence, it is vital that the EU provide appropriate 
measures to assist these countries as they adjust to the new regime.  
Both the EU and ACP/LDCs have put forward proposals to ease the adjustment 
process. The EU proposes to make adjustment assistance available, but its proposal is 
limited by its short time span, its unrealistic expectations regarding the possible speed 
with which alternative income-generating opportunities can be developed, and its 
inadequate financing. The ACP/LDCs’ proposal could potentially lead to 
unsustainable investment in uncompetitive sugar industries in these countries, and its 
logic of a managed market is at variance with the thrust of CAP reform.  
Our proposal is to complement the provision of structural adjustment assistance 
for a transition period with income assistance through a deficiency payment 
mechanism with a gradually declining guaranteed price. This would be compatible 
with the market orientation of the new sugar regime, it would avoid problems of delay 
in the disbursement of adjustment assistance, and it would limit the incentive to invest 
in unsustainable sugar industries in LDCs. The overall financial package should 
provide the same degree of compensation to ACP/LDCs as is being provided to EU 
growers, currently 60 percent of the expected revenue loss. Financing of this package 
can be found from the savings made in the current ACP-related expenditure in the 
sugar CMO. However, as the Commission has already laid claim to this to fund 
compensation to EU growers, it is likely that some form of additional revenue will be 
required. This could take the form of a consumer levy representing a proportion of the 
gains consumers would expect from the EU sugar reform, which would, in turn, have 
desirable health benefits for the EU.    H. Chaplin and A. Matthews 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
1.   These differences reflect, in part, the reality that the EU price will be influenced 
by the level of imports, but exactly how is unknown. They also reflect different 
assumptions about the extent to which LDCs will import sugar to meet domestic 
consumption while exporting domestic production to the EU to avail of the more 
attractive preferential price. 
2.   A contributing factor to this high elasticity is the ability of Brazil to divert sugar 
currently used in its domestic ethanol programme to the export market if world 
prices rise. The recent rise in world oil prices, by increasing the attractiveness of 
ethanol production, will work in the opposite direction. 
3.   “For sugar, it is clear that concerning the ACP countries some compensation or 
some aid will have to be financed, but these elements will be financed within the 
normal budget lines for helping the third countries in the ACP, EDF or the special 
lines.” Evidence of Mr Jean-Luc Demarty, Deputy Director-General of DG 
Agriculture, to the UK House of Lords European Committee, The Future 
Financing of the Common Agricultural Policy, Volume II: Evidence, 2
nd Report of 
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